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INTRODUCTION 
Police arrest Bailey and charge him with possession of cocaine with 
intent to distribute it, a federal offense.1 Instead of striking a plea 
bargain, he pleads not guilty and proceeds to trial. At trial, Bailey 
admits that he committed the offense but claims that he was entrapped 
- that is, he would not have committed the crime had an undercover 
FBI agent not convinced him to do so. The jury rejects the defense 
and finds Bailey guilty. At sentencing, the probation officer presents 
the judge with a presentence report2 stating that Bailey appears to be 
genuinely remorseful for his actions, that he has acknowledged that 
the sale of drugs is wrong, and that he has assisted law enforcement 
1. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(l) (2002). 
2. Before a judge imposes a sentence or grants probation, a probation officer is required 
to conduct a presentence investigation and prepare a report, unless the court finds that there 
is sufficient information in the record for the meaningful exercise of sentencing authority. 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(l). The report of the presentence investigation must contain 
extensive information about the defendant's background and the relevant sentencing 
classifications. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d). 
367 
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officials in their investigation. The judge explains to Bailey that he 
believes that Bailey is sorry for his actions and that Bailey has owned 
up to his participation in the crime, but that he is unable to reduce 
Bailey's sentence because in his circuit a defendant who claims 
entrapment is not entitled to a lesser sentence on the grounds of 
acceptance of responsibility.3 The judge goes on to explain that by 
claiming that he would not have committed the crime without the FBI 
agent's inducement, Bailey has disputed his intent to commit the 
crime. The judge further explains that intent is an essential factual 
element of guilt and such a dispute as to guilt precludes the 
acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment because it is an attempt to 
shift blame for the commission of the crime to law enforcement 
officials. When Bailey's attorney argues that Bailey has a constitu­
tional right to present a defense that should not prejudice his sentence, 
the judge responds that Bailey does not have a constitutional right to 
leniency, and that the entrapment defense precludes acceptance of 
responsibility. 
This fictional account highlights the tension between the 
entrapment defense and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines'4 discount 
3. The acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment allows a judge to decrease a defendant's 
base offense level if the defendant clearly demonstrates recognition and affirmative 
acceptance of personal responsibility for his criminal conduct. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDE­
LINES MANUAL § 3El.l(a) (2002) [hereinafter USSG]. The guidelines do not clearly define 
"acceptance of responsibility." They state that a guilty plea "will constitute significant 
evidence of acceptance of responsibility." USSG § 3El.1, cmt. n.3. The guidelines list several 
other factors that may be taken into consideration in determining acceptance of responsi­
bility including, inter alia, truthfully admitting the conduct comprising the offense, voluntary 
termination or withdrawal from criminal conduct or associations, and voluntary assistance to 
authorities in the recovery of the fruits and instrumentalities of the offense. USSG § 3El.1, 
cmt. n.1 (a)-(h). The guidelines also state, however, that a defendant may qualify in certain 
limited circumstances for an acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment even though he did not 
plead guilty to the crime. USSG § 3El.1, cmt. n.2. 
4. Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which created the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission, and granted it authority to create sentencing guidelines. Sentencing 
Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified in various sections of 
18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.). The Act contains detailed instructions as to how to create the 
guidelines. See 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2002). In particular, the Act directs the Commission to 
create categories of offense behavior and offender characteristics. 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(l). The 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines are a grid system with forty-three offense levels on its vertical 
axis and six criminal history categories on its horizontal axis. USSG ch. 1, pt. A, 4(h). A 
court initially assigns a base offense level for the crime or crimes for which an offender is 
being sentenced. USSG § lBl.l. Next, the court determines the criminal history category 
based on the number and type of prior convictions. Id. Once both the offense level and 
criminal history have been determined, the judge finds the point of intersection on the grid 
and assigns a sentence within the range of months listed. Id. The Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines provide for flexibility by granting adjustments and departures. See John N. 
Winstead, Note, Nunez-Rodriguez and a Defendant's Acceptance of Responsibility: A 
Jailbreak from the Confinement of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines?, 85 KY. L.J. 1021, 
1024-25 (1996-97). 
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for acceptance of responsibility.5 To successfully argue entrapment, 
there must be evidence that the defendant was not predisposed to 
commit the crime.6 Predisposition is critical because entrapment is a 
judicially created defense,7 founded upon the notion that the 
legislature could not have intended that the government would 
enforce its statutes by tempting innocent persons to violate them.8 
5. Prior to the enactment of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, defendants who pied 
guilty were often given more lenient sentences. Robert N. Strassfeld, Robert McNamara and 
the Art and Law of Confession: "A Simple Desultory Phillipic (or How I was Robert 
McNamara'd into Submission)", 47 DUKE L.J. 491, 507-511 (1997) (discussing the historical 
development of the practice of granting more lenient sentences to defendants who plead 
guilty). This was due in part to the belief that those who accept responsibility for their 
crimes, by pleading guilty, have begun the reformation process and are thus entitled to 
leniency. Id. at 510. The acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment codifies the tradition of 
offering leniency to defendants in exchange for entry of a guilty plea. See, e.g., United States 
v. Guadagno, 970 F.2d 214, 226 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Henry, 883 F.2d 1010, 1012 
(11th Cir. 1989). This tradition was deemed constitutional by the Supreme Court in Corbitt 
v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 219 (1978). The sentence discount under the acceptance-of­
responsibility adjustment, however, is not as big as the discount a defendant would have 
received prior to the enactment of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Prior to the 
enactment of the guidelines, the average sentence discount for a defendant who pied guilty 
was approximately thirty to forty percent below what a defendant who proceeded to trial 
and was convicted would receive. Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the reduction is 
approximately twenty percent. See Strassfield, supra, at 512 n.109 (citing U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM'N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND 
POLICY STATEMENTS at 48-50 (1987)). The adjustment takes a more expanded view of 
acceptance of responsibility than pre-guideline practice, however, by not precluding the 
adjustment to a defendant who proceeds to trial or guaranteeing the adjustment for a 
defendant who pleads guilty. USSG § 3El.1, cmt. n.2 (explaining that a defendant who goes 
to trial may qualify for the adjustment in rare cases); USSG § 3El.1, cmt. n.3 (explaining 
that a defendant who enters into a guilty plea is not entitled to the adjustment as a matter of 
right). By providing that a defendant who goes to trial may qualify for the adjustment, 
USSG § 3El.1, cmt. n.2 safeguards the acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment from attack 
as an unconstitutional penalty for the exercise of the right to trial. See infra Part Ill. 
6. See infra note 28 and accompanying text. 
7. The entrapment defense was formally recognized by the Supreme Court in the case of 
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). In Sorrells, a government agent posed as a 
tourist and visited the home of the defendant. Id. at 439. The agent and the defendant served 
in the same military unit during World War I. Id. The agent repeatedly asked Sorrells if he 
could obtain some liquor. Id. at 439-40. Initially, Sorrells told the agent that he did not have 
any liquor. Id. at 439. After they began speaking about their common war experiences, the 
agent made another request. Sorrells then left his home and returned with a half gallon of 
whiskey, for which the agent paid him five dollars. Id. The agent testified that he requested 
the liquor in order to prosecute Sorrells for procuring and selling liquor. Id. at 440. Sorrells 
was convicted of violating the National Prohibition Act. On appeal to the Supreme Court, 
Sorrells defended his actions by claiming entrapment. Id. at 438-39. The Supreme Court 
unanimously agreed and reversed his conviction. Prior to Sorrells, though the Supreme 
Court had suggested that solicitation of crime by the government might be improper under 
some circumstances, it had never expressly ruled that an entrapment defense existed. See, 
e.g., Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 418-19 (1928); Grimm v. United States, 156 U.S. 
604, 604-11 (1895). Lower courts, however, had widely recognized the entrapment defense 
prior to Sorrells. See, e.g. , O'Brien v. United States, 51 F.2d 674, 677 (7th Cir. 1931); Cline v. 
United States, 20 F.2d 494, 496 (8th Cir. 1927); Cermak v. United States, 4 F.2d 99, 99 (6th 
Cir. 1925); Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412, 415 (9th Cir. 1915). 
8. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 428 (1973). Entrapment is thus based on the 
rule of statutory construction that prohibits literal interpretation of a statute that produces 
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While government officials may use decoys to lure individuals 
intending or willing to commit a crime, in order for liability to attach 
the criminal design must originate with the accused and not with 
government officials. Courts examine evidence of the defendant's 
inclination to commit a particular crime in the time period before the 
defendant's initial exposure to government agents to determine if a 
defendant is predisposed to commit a particular offense.9 
The acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment enables a judge to 
reduce a sentence if he finds that the defendant owned up to his 
participation in the crime and has shown remorse for his actions.10 
While acceptance of responsibility is not defined, the Sentencing 
Guidelines' Application Notes,11 which are binding upon the courts,12 
absurd results. Sorrells, 287 U.S. 43S. The notion that Congress could not have intended its 
criminal statutes to be applied to people tempted into violation has been sharply criticized. 
See, e.g. , Sherman v. United States, 3S6 U.S. 369, 379 (19S8) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) 
(arguing that the congressional-intent justification is sheer fiction because the only intent 
Congress had in enacting criminal statutes was to set forth the elements of the crime). 
9. Russell, 411 U.S. at 436 (explaining that predisposition must be established before 
government involvement with defendant). In Russell, the defendant actively participated in 
the manufacturing of illegal drugs before government agents initiated contact. Id. The Court 
found that the defendant had a predisposition to commit the offense irrespective of the law 
enforcement techniques employed. Id.; see also Sherman, 3S6 U.S. at 372 (finding that the 
government must prove defendant otherwise inclined to commit offense prior to contact 
with government). In Sherman, the Court examined the defendant's criminal history, 
whether the defendant was engaged in the narcotics trade, and the defendant's readiness and 
willingness to sell narcotics, independent of any governmental inducement. Sherman, 3S6 
U.S. at 37S. 
10. In Bailey's case, for example, if Bailey was in possession of less than twenty-five 
grams of cocaine, his base offense level would be twelve. See Drug Quantity Table, USSG § 
2Dl.l(c)(14). This calculation assumes that no victim-related role in the offense, or 
obstruction adjustments apply. See USSG §§ 3A, 3B, & 3C (2002). Assuming that Bailey had 
one prior felony conviction in the past fifteen years, his criminal history category would be 
II. See USSG § 4Al.l(a); Sentencing Table, USSG § SA. This calculation assumes that the 
instant offense was not committed while the defendant was on probation or parole, see 
USSG § 4Al.2, or less than two years after release from imprisonment, see USSG § 
4Al.l(e). Thus, Bailey would receive a sentence of twelve to eighteen months. See Sen­
tencing Table, USSG § SA. If Bailey received a two-point adjustment for acceptance of 
responsibility, however, his base offense level would be ten and his sentence would be eight 
to fourteen months instead of twelve to eighteen months. See id. The acceptance-of­
responsibility adjustment has an even greater impact on defendants who have committed 
more serious crimes and have more extensive criminal histories. For example, someone who 
commits a level thirty-seven offense and has a criminal history category of V, would receive 
a sentence of 324-40S months. If that person were given an acceptance-of-responsibility 
adjustment of two points, he would receive a sentence of 262-327 months - a difference of 
five years and two months at the low end and six years and six months at the high end of the 
sentence. 
11. The Sentencing Commission issues commentary that guides the sentencing judge in 
imposing a sentence. USSG § lBl.7. One form of commentary is the Application Notes. 
12. The Application Notes in the Sentencing Guidelines Manual, which are under the 
Commentary heading, must be given controlling weight unless they violate the Constitution 
or a federal statute or are plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the guideline. USSG § 
lBl.7; Stinson v. United States, S08 U.S. 36, 4S (1993) (analogizing the commentary to an 
agency's interpretation of its own legislative rule). 
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explain that the acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment is not 
intended to apply to a defendant who goes to trial to contest his 
factual guilt and then later expresses remorse after his conviction.13 
Factual guilt has been interpreted by most courts to include both the 
mens rea and actus reus of an offense.14 The Application Notes, 
however, instruct that the acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment is 
allowed for a defendant who proceeds to trial to contest an issue 
unrelated to his factual guilt, such as a challenge as to whether a 
statute applies to the defendant's conduct.15 The courts that have 
addressed the issue appear to agree that the challenge-to-the­
applicability-of-the-statute exception applies when a defendant goes to 
trial to contest the legal conclusion drawn from the facts that he 
admits.16 
The conflict between the acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment 
and the entrapment defense occurs because courts view the 
acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment as a reward for total 
acknowledgment of fault and entrapment as an attempt to shift fault 
onto law enforcement officials.17 The circuit courts disagree on 
whether a defendant who unsuccessfully argues entrapment at trial is 
eligible for a reduced sentence based upon acceptance of 
13. USSG § 3El.l, cmt. n.2. 
14. See, e.g., United States v. Starks, 157 F.3d 833, 840 (11th Cir. 1998) (finding that 
intent is a factual element of guilt and cannot be contested without putting the acceptance­
of-responsibility adjustment in jeopardy); United States v. Crass, 50 F.3d 81, 83-84 (1st Cir. 
1995) (same); United States v. Lindholm, 24 F.3d 1078, 1087 (9th Cir. 1994) (same). 
15. USSG § 3El.1, cmt. n.2. 
16. See, e.g., United States v. Purchess, 107 F.3d 1261, 1267 (7th Cir. 1997) (concluding 
that a "district court should not deny the reduction for acceptance of responsibility because 
the defendant challenges a legal conclusion drawn from facts the defendant admits"); United 
States v. Smith, 106 F.3d 350 (11th Cir. 1996) (finding that where a defendant admits all the 
necessary facts of his scheme to the government, "he should not be precluded from having 
counsel argue the legal effect of those facts to the sentencing court by risking the benefits 
derived by his candid admissions"); United States v. Fells, 78 F.3d 168, 172 (5th Cir. 1996) 
(holding that a district court erred in denying reduction for a defendant who challenged 
venue because the defendant had "freely admitted all the facts but challenged their legal 
interpretation"); United States v. Broussard, 987 F.2d 215, 224 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that a 
district court erred in denying an acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment when a defendant 
admitted ownership of guns found in the defendant's home and went to trial only to argue 
that the statute did not apply to uncontested facts), overruled on other grounds by J.E.B. v. 
Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994). 
17. See, e.g. , United States v. Kirkland, 104 F.3d 1403, 1405 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("The 
defendant, by asking for the downward departure, is in effect claiming that he accepts 
responsibility even though he was not responsible for his acts."); United States v. Hansen, 
964 F.2d 1017, 1021 (10th Cir. 1992) ("It is difficult for this Court to envision how the 
defendant argues that he affirmatively accepted responsibility for his criminal action when 
throughout the proceedings he maintained that his criminal action was not his fault, but 
rather, it was the result of government inducement."); United States v. Demes, 941 F.2d 220, 
222 (3d Cir. 1991) ("The defendant, rather than accepting 'personal responsibility for his 
criminal conduct' urges that the party responsible for the offense was actually the 
government." (internal citations omitted)). 
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responsibility.18 Some circuits have found that the predisposition 
inquiry in entrapment is tantamount to an inquiry about intent.19 Thus, 
according to these circuits, entrapment is a dispute about factual guilt 
and does not give rise to one of those rare situations where a 
defendant goes to trial and remains eligible for the acceptance-of­
responsibility adjustment. The Tenth Circuit, however, has found that 
entrapment is not a challenge to factual guilt because the entrapment 
defense does nothing more than challerige whether the statute applies 
to the defendant's conduct.20 
While the debate in the circuit courts has focused on whether the 
entrapment defense disputes factual guilt, there is a constitutional 
issue that has remained unexamined. It has long been held that courts 
may not use the exercise of constitutional rights against a defendant at 
the sentencing stage.21 Defendants have a constitutional right to 
present a defense22 that stands on equal constitutional footing with 
other rights protected by the Sixth Amendment.23 Thus, the question 
18. In United States v. Garcia, 182 F.3d 1165 (10th Cir. 1999), the Tenth Circuit joined 
the First, Third, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits in concluding that entrapment and the 
acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment are not necessarily incompatible. The court decided 
that by proceeding to trial to assert an entrapment defense, a defendant attempts to preserve 
an issue that does not relate to factual guilt. Id. In Kirkland, the D.C. Circuit found that a 
claim of entrapment seems particularly inconsistent with a demonstrated acceptance of 
responsibility, but fell short of holding that it was impossible that the two could be 
consistent. Kirkland, 104 F.3d at 1405-06. The Fifth and Eighth Circuits, however, have held 
that the entrapment defense and the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction are incom­
patible. United States v. Chevre, 146 F.3d 622, 625 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Brace, 
145 F.3d 246, 265 (5th Cir. 1998). In Brace, 145 F.3d at 265, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that 
although the defendant admitted committing criminal acts, his assertion of entrapment was a 
denial of factual guilt because it was a denial of subjective predisposition and the required 
element of mens rea. 
19. See, e.g. , Brace, 145 F.3d at 265. 
20. Garcia, 182 F.3d 1165. 
21. See, e.g. , United States v. Watts, 910 F.2d 587, 592 (9th Cir. 1990) (explaining that a 
sentencing court cannot balance constitutionally protected conduct, such as requesting 
counsel or invoking the privilege not to make statements to the police, against evidence of 
remorse or acceptance of responsibility); Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 124 (1972) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that where the original conviction was set aside due to 
constitutional error, the imposition of a more severe punishment would serve to penalize the 
defendant for exercising his constitutional rights and would be "patently unconstitutional" 
(quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969))); United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 
570, 583-85 (1968) (invalidating the death penalty provision of Federal Kidnapping Act 
because only those defendants who abandon the constitutional right to contest their guilt 
before a jury are assured they will not be executed). The Court went on to explain that 
"(t]his construction of Section 3El.1 will avoid an unconstitutional application of the 
Sentencing Guidelines." Id. 
22. See infra note 83 and accompanying text. 
23. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 409 (1988). The Sixth Amendment provides: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by 
an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, 
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the 
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
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becomes what, if any, impact the constitutional right to present 
a defense has on the acceptance-of-responsibility/entrapment dis­
cussion. 
This Note argues that Section 3El.1 of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines must be interpreted to allow defendants who claim 
entrapment at trial to remain eligible for the acceptance-of­
responsibility adjustment. To interpret Section 3El.1 in any other way 
would run afoul of defendants' constitutional right to present a 
defense. Part I argues that the entrapment defense does not put 
factual guilt at issue; instead the entrapment defense challenges 
whether the statute should apply to the defendant's conduct. Part II 
contends that the legislative intent in creating the sentencing 
guidelines in general and the acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment 
in particular are furthered by requiring sentencing judges to make 
individualized assessments about the extent to which defendants have 
accepted responsibility. Part III argues that the use of the entrapment 
defense as an automatic bar to the receipt of the acceptance-of­
responsibility adjustment is a penalty for the exercise of the 
defendant's constitutional right to present the entrapment defense. 
This Note concludes that because the assertion of entrapment and 
acceptance of responsibility are not inherently inconsistent, the use of 
a per se rule barring the adjustment is a violation of the defendant's 
constitutional right to present a defense. 
I. THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE DOES NOT DISPUTE FACTUAL 
GUILT 
Sentencing courts that prohibit defendants who unsuccessfully 
claim entrapment at trial from rece1vmg the acceptance-of­
responsibility adjustment do so by mischaracterizing the nature of the 
entrapment defense. In any criminal case, the government must prove 
that the defendant committed a criminal act, the "actus reus," and that 
the defendant had a culpable state of mind, or "mens rea," in order to 
obtain a conviction.24 Both the actus reus and mens rea are 
components of factual guilt. Some courts have found the entrapment 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and the have the Assistance of 
Counsel for his defence. 
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
24. See Ariel L. Bendor, Prior Restraint, Incommensurability, and the Constitutionalism 
of Means, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 289, 339 (1999) (explaining that in order to hold a 
defendant criminally liable, it must be shown that he "was aware of his conduct and the 
circumstances in which it was performed" (citing Alan C. Michaels, Acceptance: The Missing 
Mental State, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 953, 958-59 (1998))). "The Constitution limits the state's 
power to create strict liability offenses; that is, offenses that do not include a mental 
element." Bendor, supra, at 339-40 (citing Alan C. Michaels, Constitutional Innocence, 112 
HARV. L. REV. 828, 830 (1999)). 
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defense to be a challenge to factual guilt by confusing mens rea with 
predisposition. 25 
Entrapment, however, is an affirmative defense that does not 
negate an element of the crime.26 The crux of the entrapment defense 
is causation, or whether the defendant would have committed the 
crime had the government not induced him.27 Once the defendant has 
shown that the government induced the commission of the crime, the 
burden shifts to the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime before being 
approached by law enforcement officials.28 In practice, the focus is 
almost exclusively on predisposition.29 Predisposition to commit a 
crime concerns the defendant's propensity to perpetrate a crime as 
separate from the government's inducement.30 A court considering an 
25. See, e.g., United States v. Brace, 145 F.3d 247, 265 (5th Cir. 1998) (en bane) ("[A Jn 
entrapment defense is a challenge to criminal intent and thus to culpability."); United States 
v. Kirkland, 104 F.3d 1403, 1405 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding that it is "rather obvious that the 
entrapment defense is a way of challenging one 'factual element[ ] of guilt' - intent" 
(alteration in original)). 
26. "[T]he absence of entrapment is not an essential element of a charged offense; 
instead, entrapment is an affirmative defense." Brace, 145 F.3d at 257; see also United States 
v. Bala, 236 F.3d 87, 94 (2d Cir. 2000) (entrapment is an affirmative defense); United States 
v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542, 564 (4th Cir. 2000) (same); United States v. Wise, 221 F.3d 140, 
154 (5th Cir. 2000) (same); United States v. Dumas, 207 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir. 2000) (same); 
United States v. Blassingame, 197 F.3d 271, 279 (7th Cir. 1999) (same); Vega v. Suthers, 195 
F.3d 573, 583 (10th Cir. 1999) (same); United States v. Berg, 178 F.3d 976, 980 (8th Cir. 1999) 
(same); United States v. Roper, 135 F.3d 430, 435 (6th Cir. 1998) (same); United States v. 
Quinn, 123 F.3d 1415, 1423 (11th Cir. 1997) (same). 
27. United States v. Garcia, 182 F.3d 1165, 1173 (10th Cir. 1999). To determine 
predisposition, a court may look at the following factors: 
(1) the character or reputation of the defendant; (2) whether the suggestion of criminal 
activity was originally made by the government; (3) whether the defendant was engaged in 
criminal activity for a profit; (4) whether the defendant evidenced a reluctance to commit 
the offense, overcome by government persuasion; and (5) the nature of the inducement or 
persuasion offered by the government. 
United States v. Haddad, 976 F.2d 1088, 1095 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Ian J. McLoughlin, 
Note, The Meaning of Predisposition in Practice, 79 B.U. L. Rev. 1067, 1071-72 (1999) 
(explaining that in entrapment cases the Supreme Court has historically focused on the 
"defendant's state of mind or lack of predisposition to commit the alleged crime"). 
28. United States v. Nelson, 922 F.2d 311, 317 (6th Cir. 1990); Mathews v. United States, 
485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988). To be entitled to an entrapment instruction, however, a defendant 
must "come forward with evidence that government agents implanted criminal design in his 
mind and induced him to commit the offense." Nelson, 922 F.2d at 317 (quoting United 
States v. Felix, 867 F.2d 1068, 1074 (8th Cir. 1989)). "[E]vidence that Government agents 
merely afforded an opportunity or facilities for the commission of the crime would be 
insufficient to warrant such an instruction." Mathews, 485 U.S. at 66. 
29. See Troy A. Wolf, Note, Criminal Law - Persistence Pays: Enforcement Efforts to 
Solicit Illegal Activity, 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 913, 918 (1991). 
30. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 432, 442 (1932) (finding that government 
officials may not implant in individual's mind disposition to commit offense). Predisposition 
focuses on the defendant's state of mind prior to contact with government agents. United 
States v. Osborne, 935 F.2d 32, 38 (4th Cir. 1991) (predisposition is defendant's decision to 
commit crime and not a product of government persuasion); United States v. Kaminski, 703 
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entrapment defense asks, "how the defendant likely would have 
reacted to an ordinary [that is, noninduced] opportunity to commit the 
crime."31 
Predisposition, however, is not the same as intent to commit a 
crime. A defendant who claims entrapment does not argue that he did 
not intend to commit the crime for which he is standing trial.32 Rather, 
the defendant argues that in spite of his intent to commit the offense 
and actual commission of the crime, the government should not be 
entitled to obtain a conviction due to its role in encouraging the crime. 
Predisposition and intent look at the defendant's state of mind at 
different points of time. Predisposition looks back in time to the 
defendant's inclination to commit the offense prior to its commission 
to determine if the defendant was motivated by his own desires or 
induced by a government official.33 Intent, on the other hand, is the 
defendant's mental resolution or determination to commit the 
criminal act at the time it takes place.34 While the government bears 
the burden of proving an individual's predisposition if he claims 
F.2d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 1983) (predisposition must exist prior to contact with the 
government). Predisposition may be inferred from a prior history of engaging in the same 
type of criminal behavior combined with an eager response to the government's offer. 
United States v. Ortiz, 804 F.2d 1161, 1165 (10th Cir. 1986) (inducement implicates whether 
defendant was eager or reluctant to engage in criminal offense). The defendant's criminal 
state of mind must exist before government agents suggest that the defendant commit a 
crime. Kaminski, 703 F.2d at 1008 (discussing existence of defendant's predisposition prior 
to government inducement). The amount of inducement the government offers to the 
defendant has no correlation to the defendant's predisposition; rather, predisposition is an 
independent determination of the defendant's ready acquiescence to commit an offense. Id. 
(discussing the relevance of amount of inducement to predisposition inquiry). Predisposition 
is usually a question of fact for the jury. See Paul Marcus, Proving Entrapment Under the 
Predisposition Test, 14 AM. J. CRIM. L. 53, 70 (1987) (individual's state of mind at time of 
government inducement is a matter given to trier of fact). 
31. United States v. Gendron, 18 F.3d 955, 962 (1st Cir. 1994). 
32. "When a defendant pleads entrapment, he is asserting that, although he had criminal 
intent, it was 'the Government's deception [that implanted] the criminal design in the mind 
of the defendant."' Mathews, 485 U.S. at 62 (quoting United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 
436 (1973)); see also United States v. Hill, 655 F.2d 512, 514 (3d Cir. 1981) (explaining that 
the entrapment defense "requires admission of guilt of the crime charged and all of its 
elements, including the required mental state"); United States v. Mitchell, 514 F.2d 758, 760-
61 (6th Cir. 1975) (defense of entrapment "admits all [of the] elements of the offense" 
(quoting United States v. Lamonge, 458 F.2d 197, 201 (6th Cir. 1972))). 
33. See, e.g. , United States v. Evans, 216 F.3d 80, 88 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (predisposition 
goes to state of mind - why the defendant did what he did). The inducement requirement is 
met if the government's conduct "created a substantial risk that the offense would be 
committed by a person other than one ready to commit it." United States v. Andrews, 765 
F.2d 1491, 1499 (11th Cir. 1985) (quoting United States v. Dickens, 524 F.2d 441, 444 (5th 
Cir. 1975)); see also United States v. Kelly, 748 F.2d 691, 697 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("Inducement 
focuses on whether the government's conduct could have caused an undisposed person to 
commit a crime."); United States v. Van Slyke, 976 F.2d 1159, 1162 (8th Cir. 1992} (same). 
34. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 810 (6th ed. 1990). 
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entrapment,35 the fact that the government must prove predisposition 
does not transform it into an element of the crime. As currently 
formulated, the entrapment defense presupposes that an individual is 
factually guilty of the crime for which he is charged.36 Therefore, it is a 
fallacy to equate intent and predisposition. 
As the entrapment defense does not put intent to commit the 
crime at issue, it is not a challenge to factual guilt. An individual who 
claims entrapment denies legal, rather than factual, responsibility for 
the crime.37 Application Note 2 of the acceptance-of-responsibility 
adjustment explains that in "rare situations" a defendant who is 
convicted at trial may clearly demonstrate acceptance of responsibility 
if he proceeds to trial to make a "challenge to the applicability of a 
statute to his conduct."38 This language mirrors the way the Supreme 
Court has written about entrapment, i.e., "the question is whether the 
defense, if the facts bear it out, takes the case out of the purview of the 
statute" because Congress did not "intend[) that the letter of its 
enactment should be used to support such a gross perversion of its 
purpose."39 A defendant who raises an entrapment defense admits that 
he has committed a crime but argues that he should not be held 
accountable for it.40 The defendant, therefore, goes to trial to contest 
the legal conclusion drawn from the facts that he admits.41 Thus, a 
defendant who raises entrapment argues that the statute under which 
he is being charged should not apply to his conduct.42 As such, the 
entrapment defense falls squarely into the exception in Application 
Note 2 that allows defendants to remain eligible for the Section 3El.1 
adjustment. Accordingly, the mere fact that a defendant raised an 
entrapment defense at trial is not enough, standing alone, to deny him 
an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. 
35. United States v. Brace, 145 F.3d 247, 257 (5th Cir. 1998) ("(T]he absence of 
entrapment is not an essential element of a charged offense; instead, entrapment is an 
affirmative defense."). 
36. See United States v. Garcia, 182 F.3d 1165, 1173 (10th Cir. 1999) (explaining that the 
entrapment defense "concedes that the defendant's conduct satisfies the essential factual 
elements of guilt"); see also Maureen F.J. Whelan, Note, Lead Us Not Into (Unwarranted) 
Temptation: A Proposal to Replace the Entrapment Defense With a Reasonable-Suspicion 
Requirement, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 1193, 1205-06 (1985). 
37. See Strassfeld, supra note 5, at 518 (explaining the courts' treatment of defenses that 
deny legal responsibility in the context of the acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment). 
38. USSG § 3El.1, cmt. n.2. 
39. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 452 (1932). 
40. Entrapment presupposes the commission of a crime. United States v. Russell, 411 
U.S. 423, 435 (1973). 
41. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
42 See United States v. Garcia, 182 F.3d 1165, 1173 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding that 
entrapment is a "challenge to the applicability of a statute to the defendant's conduct" 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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II. CONGRESSIONAL OBJECTIVES OF THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
Sentencing courts have three choices as to how to treat defendants 
who claimed entrapment at trial. The first is to create a per se rule that 
prohibits courts from granting an acceptance-of-responsibility 
adjustment; the second is to automatically grant the acceptance-of­
responsibility adjustment; and the third is to require the courts to 
make case-by-case determinations of defendants' contriteness. The 
question then becomes which of these three options furthers the goals 
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. This Part argues that requiring 
judges to make case-by-case determinations of acceptance of 
responsibility for defendants who claimed entrapment at trial is 
consistent with the statutory objectives of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines. Section II.A argues that the purposes of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines are not furthered by the creation of a per se 
rule; instead, they are furthered by requiring courts to make individual 
assessments about the extent to which defendants have accepted 
responsibility. Section 11.B argues that there is nothing inherent in the 
nature of the entrapment defense that is inconsistent with the goals of 
the acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment. This Part concludes that 
defendants who claim entrapment at trial should be given the 
opportunity to prove to the sentencing judge that they have accepted 
responsibility for their crimes. To construe Section 3E1.1 otherwise 
would vitiate a vital, albeit narrow, realm of discretion carved out for 
sentencing judges under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 
Federal statutes, such as the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, are 
interpreted by examining the language of the statute itself.43 Where 
the language is not dispositive, courts look to the congressional intent 
"revealed in the history and purposes of the statutory scheme."44 The 
court's duty "is to find that interpretation which can most fairly be 
said to be imbedded in the statute, in the sense of being most 
harmonious with its scheme and with the general purposes that 
Congress manifested. "45 As the statutory language is silent as to 
whether a defendant who claims entrapment is eligible for the 
adjustment, the terms of the statute are to be interpreted in light of 
both Congress's purpose in enacting the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines and the acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment, and the 
historical background of the guidelines and the adjustment, which is 
detailed in this Part. 
43. Connecticut Nat'I Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992). 
44. Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 642 (1990). 
45. C.I.R. v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 217 (1984). 
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A. The Twin Goals of Uniformity and Proportionality 
Prior to the promulgation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 
sentencing was generally guided by the rehabilitative ideal, which 
sought to transform the criminal into a person who, upon return to 
society, will conform her behavior to societal norms.46 As a result, a 
trial judge in the federal judicial system had wide discretion in 
determining what sentence to impose.47 In making his determination, 
the trial judge was permitted to conduct an inquiry broad in scope, 
largely unlimited as to either the kind of information he might 
consider, or the source from which it might come.48 This led to gross 
disparities in the sentences assigned by judges for similar crimes and 
similar offenders, particularly along race and class lines.49 
In creating the new sentencing laws, Congress sought to limit this 
boundless discretion.50 Thus, the Sentencing Commission focused on 
honesty,51 uniformity, and proportionality in sentencing to achieve the 
goal of increasing the criminal justice system's ability to reduce crime 
through fair and effective means.52 The goal of uniformity is to narrow 
46 . . See w A YNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN w. scorr, JR., 1 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LA w 
§ 1.5, 38-40 (1986), reprinted in YALE KAMISAR ET AL., ADVANCED CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
1531, 1532 (1999) (explaining that the trend in sentencing prior to the enactment of the 
sentencing guidelines was to influence future conduct); see also Williams v. New York, 337 
U.S. 241, 248 (1949) (explaining that the dominant objective of criminal law is no longer 
retribution, but instead reformation and rehabilitation). 
47. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446-47 (1972) (collecting cases). See generally 
Daniel J. Fried, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the 
Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1687-89 (1992) (discussing the different 
methodologies pre-guideline courts used to sentence offenders). 
48. Tucker, 404 U.S. at 446-47. 
49. KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 46, at 1538 (explaining that these gross disparities along 
race and class lines led to efforts to reform discretionary sentencing and the disparities it 
produced). 
50. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(l)(B) (2000) (stating that one of the goals of the new sentencing 
policies is to avoid "unwarranted sentencing disparities"); see also 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) 
(explaining that "[t]he Commission shall assure that the guidelines and policy statements are 
entirely neutral as to race, sex, national origin, creed, and socioeconomic status of 
offenders"). 
51. In an attempt to achieve honesty in sentencing, Congress abolished parole. USSG 
ch. 1, pt. A, 3. Parole, one of the vestiges of the rehabilitative system of punishment, 
perpetuated indeterminate sentencing by allowing the parole commission, not the sentencing 
court, to determine how much of a court-imposed sentence the offender would actually 
serve. See, e.g., United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 188-90 (1979) (explaining that a 
judge cannot predict when an offender will be released, and the Parole Commission is in the 
best position to determine release date). "An indeterminate sentence is a maximum and 
minimum term and set by the judge, which leaves to the parole board the task of 
determining the precise date at which the defendant will actually finish his sentence." 
KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 46, at 1536 n.2. Indeterminate sentences "encourage[ ] efforts 
to reform and permit[ ] the actual sentence to track the rehabilitative progress of an 
offender." Id. 
52. USSG ch. 1, pt. A, 3. 
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the gap in sentences imposed by judges for similar criminal conduct by 
similar offenders.53 The goal of proportionality requires different 
sentences for criminal conduct of differing severity.54 While uniformity 
and proportionality can conflict with one another,55 the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines attempt to address both goals by setting forth a 
grid system that considers the offense and the individual character­
istics of the offender.56 
The goal of proportionality is not subverted by allowing a 
defendant who claims entrapment to receive the adjustment. In fact, 
the goal of proportionality is undermined by creating a per se rule 
against the granting of the adjustment or automatically granting the 
adjustment. While there is no constitutional right to an individualized 
sentencing determination in noncapital cases,57 the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines require a judge to examine individual characteristics.58 The 
sentencing grid instructs the judge to look at the characteristics of the 
particular defendant before him and of the particular crime 
committed.59 When the judge combines all of the factors he gets an 
individualized determination. If warranted by the situation of the 
defendant, the judge still has discretion to depart from the guidelines 
or adjust the base offense level to create a fair and just sentence.60 This 
discretion is necessary to achieve proportionality. Proportionality is 
destroyed, however, when circuit courts create a per se rule that bars 
the adjustment because it takes away sentencing courts' ability to 
examine defendants' contriteness, an important circumstance in 
fashioning a sentence. Further, the simple assertion of the entrapment 
defense coupled with acknowledgment of underlying criminal activity 
should not automatically entitle a defendant to an acceptance-of-
53. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(l)(B) (1993) (explaining that the purpose of the 
Sentencing Commission is to create sentencing guidelines that "avoid[ ] unwarranted 
sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of 
similar criminal conduct"). 
54. USSG ch. 1, pt. A, 3. 
55. For example, "simple uniformity - sentencing every offender to five years -
destroys proportionality" because it does not take into account the seriousness of each 
defendant's criminal conduct. Id. 
56. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
57. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965-66 (1991). 
58. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(l)(B) (explaining that one of the Sentencing Commission's goals 
is to set flexible sentencing policies in order to permit individualized sentences when 
warranted). 
59. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
60. The guidelines were intended to reduce disparity in the sentencing of different 
defendants for similar offenses. United States v. Mejia-Orosco, 867 F.2d 216, 218 (5th Cir. 
1989). They do not, however, entirely abrogate the district court's discretion. The guideline 
range "allows the district court some latitude to fine tune the sentence to the individual 
defendant and the circumstances of the defendant's offense." Id. at 219. 
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responsibility adjustment. Such a rule would violate the rule of 
proportionality in the same way that a blanket rule barring the 
adjustment would because it would reward the defendant without 
regard to his remorse. Thus, to preserve proportionality, sentencing 
courts must make case-by-case determinations about the extent to 
which defendants have accepted responsibility. 
On the surface, it may seem that uniformity in sentencing is 
furthered by the creation of a per se rule. If there is a per se rule, the 
judge does not use the acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment to 
reduce the sentence of any defendant who claimed entrapment at trial. 
Thus, the result for defendants who claim entrapment is completely 
uniform - no reduction for acceptance of responsibility. If courts 
granted the adjustment to any defendant who claimed entrapment, the 
result would be similarly uniform. In reality, however, uniformity is 
concerned with eliminating sentencing disparities for offenders who 
commit similar crimes. Therefore, if circuit courts create a rule 
providing that all defendants who assert the entrapment defense are to 
be treated alike, they are not furthering the goal of uniformity because 
the defense that is asserted is not necessarily related to the crime 
committed. It is the crime that is to be punished, not the defense. 
It is Congress's job, through the Sentencing Commission, to create 
categories of offenses and offenders and determine a suitable range of 
punishment. It is the sentencing courts' duty to apply these guidelines, 
not to create additional rules that are not based upon empirical 
analysis. Categorical rules, such as one that renders a class of 
defendants ineligible for a sentencing adjustment, reflect broad 
generalizations holding true in so many cases that inquiry into whether 
they apply in the case at hand would be needless and wasteful.61 It is 
improper for a court to make such a determination.62 This is especially 
true where, as here, courts have failed to adequately justify the 
generalization that a defendant who claims entrapment is never 
remorseful or cooperative enough to evidence acceptance of 
responsibility. Instead, the courts simply say that entrapment is the 
"antithesis" of acceptance of responsibility.63 Such a cursory 
61. See, e.g, State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 8-22 (1997). 
62. The purpose of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines is to curb some of the courts' 
discretion in sentencing. USSG, ch. 1 pt. A, 3. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b), "[t)he court shall 
impose a sentence . . .  within the range, referred to in subsection (a)(4) unless the court finds 
that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not 
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the 
guidelines . . . .  " Further, under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c), the court must give a statement of 
reasons for imposing a particular sentence. 
63. See, e.g., United States v. Rector, 111 F.3d 503, 508 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. 
Demes, 941 F.2d 220, 222 (3d Cir. 1991). See also supra Part I. 
November 2004] The Forgotten Constitutional Right 381 
examination is unacceptable in light of Congress's statutory directive 
for individualized sentencing.64 
B. Entrapment Is Consistent with the Purposes of Section 3El.1 
The purpose of the acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment is to 
reward defendants for showing remorse for their criminal conduct and 
for cooperating with law enforcement.65 This is consistent with the pre­
guideline history of leniency for acceptance of responsibility. Prior to 
the enactment of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the Supreme 
Court recognized the importance of a defendant's cooperation with 
law enforcement officials in determining an appropriate sentence.66 
According to the Supreme Court, 
Few facts available to a sentencing judge are more relevant to the 
likelihood that a defendant will transgress no more, the hope that he may 
respond to rehabilitative efforts to assist with a lawful future career, and 
the degree to which he does or does not deem himself at war with his 
society.67 
In addition, the acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment was supposed 
to provide the kind of incentive to plead guilty that had traditionally 
been offered by prosecutors and judges before the guidelines went 
into effect.68 The entrapment defense is consistent with the purposes of 
the acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment as they existed prior to 
and after the enactment of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 
Application Note l(a) to section 3El.1 states that one of the factors in 
determining whether a defendant has clearly demonstrated acceptance 
64. The guidelines resolve the conflict between proportionality and uniformity in favor 
of individualized sentencing. "The increase in uniformity was not, however, to be achieved 
through sacrificing proportionality. The guidelines must authorize appropriately different 
sentences for criminal conduct of significantly different severity." Danielle D. Giroux, Note, 
My Dictionary or Yours? The Supreme Court's Interpretation of "Carrying" Under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(C) (l) in Muscarello v. United States, 8 GEO. MASON L. RE V. 355, 379 n.233 (Winter 
1999) (quoting U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS, June 18, 1987, p. G-21). 
65. See Michael M. O'Hear, Remorse, Cooperation, and "Acceptance of Responsibility ": 
The Structure, Implementation, and Reform of Section 3El.l of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1507, 1509 (explaining that the Application Notes to the 
guidelines "reflect two distinct, and sometimes competing, visions of what it means to 
'accept responsibility' for an offense: either to feel remorse for the offense or to provide 
cooperation to police, prosecutors, and court officials"). Discussion of the statutory goals in 
enacting section 3El.1 is lacking in the case law and is often inferred based on the structure 
of section 3El.1.  
66. Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 558 (1980) (finding that it was proper for a 
sentencing judge to consider a defendant's lack of cooperation with law enforcement 
officials in sentencing because of the "deeply rooted social obligation" to assist authorities). 
67. Id. at 558 (quoting United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 51 (1978)) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
68. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
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of responsibility is whether the defendant has "truthfully admit[ ed] the 
conduct comprising the offense(s) of conviction . . . . "69 The remaining 
factors in Application Note 1 focus on cooperating with law 
enforcement, terminating criminal conduct, and restitution or other 
rehabilitative efforts.70 This shows that the concern of the acceptance­
of-responsibility adjustment is with an admission of criminal conduct, 
remorse, and cooperation. A defendant must admit the "conduct 
comprising the offense" in order to claim the defense of entrapment.71 
The dispute in entrapment is whether the defendant would have 
committed the crime in the absence of government inducement, not 
whether the defendant performed the criminal act.72 
Further, there is no reason to believe that a defendant who claimed 
entrapment at trial is incapable of showing remorse or cooperating 
with law enforcement. When an appellate court creates a per se rule, a 
district court must deny the acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment 
even if the defendant has shown remorse and cooperated with law 
enforcement. If the concern of the adjustment is to reward defendants 
for admitting their criminal conduct, showing remorse, and 
cooperating with law enforcement, then the creation of a per se rule 
undermines a court's ability to apply the acceptance-of-responsibility 
adjustment properly. Requiring courts to grant the adjustment 
whenever a defendant claims entrapment would do just as much to 
undermine the purpose of the acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment 
as would a per se rule prohibiting courts from granting the adjustment. 
There is nothing in the entrapment defense that makes it either 
inherently compatible or incompatible with the acceptance-of­
responsibility adjustment. As such, district courts must retain the 
discretion to make the acceptance-of-responsibility determination in 
each case. 
Furthermore, nothing in Section 3El.1  evidences a legislative 
intent to categorically prevent a defendant who admits his criminal 
conduct, cooperates with law enforcement, and shows remorse for his 
crime from receiving an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility 
solely on the basis of an entrapment defense. In fact, there are no 
69. USSG § 3El.1, cmt. n.l(a). There is no indication of whether the "conduct 
comprising the offense" simply refers to the actus reus of a crime or if it includes the mens 
rea as well. As it was established in Part I that entrapment does not put mens rea at issue, it 
is irrelevant whether "conduct comprising the offense" refers to mens rea. 
70. USSG § 3El.1, cmt. n.l(b)-(h). 
71. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973) ("[Entrapment] is rooted . . .  in the 
notion that Congress could not have intended criminal punishment for a defendant who has 
committed all the elements of a proscribed offense, but was induced to commit them by the 
Government." (emphasis added)); see also RONALD J. ALLEN ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 999 (3d ed. 1995) ("Typically defendants claiming entrapment do 
not challenge the prosecutor's proof of the elements of the offense."). 
72. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
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absolute rules in Section 3El.l .73 Most remarkably, Application Note 
4 indicates that conduct resulting in an obstruction-of-justice 
enhancement "ordinarily indicates" that the defendant is not entitled 
to an adjustment, but there might be "extraordinary cases" where the 
obstruction-of-justice and acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment 
would both apply.74 Section 3Cl.1,  Obstructing or Impeding the 
Administration of Justice, requires a district court to impose a two­
level sentencing enhancement if the defendant "willfully obstructed or 
impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of 
justice during the course of the investigation, prosecution, or 
sentencing of the instant offense of conviction" if the obstructive 
conduct related to the offense of conviction or a "closely related 
offense."75 One type of conduct that merits the adjustment is perjury.76 
Other types of conduct include threatening a co-defendant, witness, or 
juror, producing false documents, destroying or concealing evidence, 
or escaping or attempting to escape from custody.77 A defendant who 
engaged in any of the above-mentioned conduct remains eligible for 
the acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment. Certainly that type of 
conduct is more severe than the conduct of a defendant who takes the 
stand merely to assert that he performed a criminal act, but that it was 
out of character for him. 
Whether the police entrapped a defendant in a given situation is a 
debatable question. The defendant attempts to convince the jury that 
he would not have committed the criminal act if the police had not 
convinced him to do so. The government attempts to persuade the 
jury that the defendant would have performed the criminal act even if 
the police had not been involved. A defendant, particularly a first 
offender, could genuinely believe that his will was overborne by the 
73. Application Note 1, for example, instructs the trial court to examine certain factors, 
but cautions that the inquiry is not "limited to" those factors. USSG § 3El.1, cmt. n.1. 
Application Note 2 explains that conviction by trial "does not automatically preclude" a 
defendant from consideration for an adjustment. USSG § 3El.1, cmt. n.2. Application Note 
3 states that entry of a guilty plea does not entitle a defendant to an adjustment "as a matter 
of right." USSG § 3El.l, cmt. n.3. Application Note 6 explains that the timeliness of an 
applicant's acceptance of responsibility is a consideration that is "context specific." USSG § 
3El.1, cmt. n.6. 
74. USSG § 3El.1, cmt. n.4. 
75. USSG § 3Cl.1. 
76. USSG § 3Cl.1, cmt. n.4(b); United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 98 (1993) 
(holding that "[u]pon a proper determination that the accused has committed perjury at 
trial," the accused's trial testimony can supply the basis for application of the section 3Cl.l 
enhancement). To decide when an accused's testimony constitutes perjury, Dunnigan 
adopted the federal criminal definition of perjury set out in 18 U.S.C. § 1621. Dunnigan, 507 
U.S. at 94. Under that definition, "[a] witness testifying under oath or affirmation [commits 
perjury] if she gives false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful intent to 
provide false testimony, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory." Id. 
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 1621(1)). 
77. USSG § 3Cl .1, cmt. n.4(a)-(e). 
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persuasive tactics of the police. The fact that a jury finds that a 
defendant was predisposed and, thus, that he likely would have 
committed the offense without government inducement, does not 
mean that the defendant was lying. A defendant's testimony that he 
would not have engaged in criminal conduct absent the police 
inducement would not even support a finding of perjury. Perjury 
requires that the defendant willfully intend to give false testimony 
concerning a material matter.78 Even if the defendant's testimony 
amounted to perjury, however, he would not be foreclosed from 
receiving the adjustment.79 If a defendant can obstruct justice and 
remain eligible for an acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment, then 
there is simply no rational reason to prohibit courts from granting the 
adjustment to defendants who claimed entrapment at trial. 
The bottom line is that acceptance of responsibility is a 
discretionary decision, placed in the hands of a district court, that the 
Sentencing Commission did not think was amenable to mechanical 
rules of application. Requiring courts to make case-by-case 
determinations of defendants' remorse preserves the integrity of the 
adjustment. A per se rule, however, removes the discretionary 
acceptance-of-responsibility determination from the district court and 
places it in the hands of the appellate court. Such a removal directly 
contravenes the statutory purpose. 
III. THE IMPACT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRESENT A 
DEFENSE 
The goals of the acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment are 
furthered by requiring judges to make case-by-case determinations of 
contriteness for defendants who claimed entrapment at trial. As such, 
the creation of a bright line rule that prohibits district courts from 
considering the adjustment for defendants who claim entrapment is a 
violation of the constitutional right to present a defense. Because a per 
se bar on defendants who assert entrapment singles them out and 
categorically prevents them from eligibility for leniency, the per se 
rule unconstitutionally punishes defendants. 
The constitutional right to present a defense derives from the 
Compulsory Process and Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth 
Amendment.80 The Compulsory Process Clause guarantees a 
defendant the right to subpoena witnesses and have them testify on 
78. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 94. 
79. USSG § 3El.1, cmt. n.4. 
80. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22 (1967). 
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her behalf.81 In addition, the Confrontation Clause gives defendants 
the right to subject prosecution witnesses to cross-examination.82 
Together, these protections provide what the Supreme Court has 
termed the constitutional right to present a defense.83 Beginning in 
1967, with Washington v. Texas,84 the Supreme Court held that "the 
right to present a defense . . .  is a fundamental element of due process 
of law."85 Not long after, in the seminal decision Chambers v. 
Mississippi in 1973, the Court concluded that the fundamental 
constitutional right to present a defense includes the right to present 
exculpatory evidence.86 Then in 1988, in Taylor v. Illinois, the Court 
81. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. at 19 ("Just as an 
accused has the right to confront the prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of challenging 
their testimony, he has the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense. This 
right is a fundamental element of due process of law."); Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 407-
09 (1988). 
82 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678-79 (1986). 
83. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. at 19. The Court has explained that the rights that 
make up the right to present a defense are truth-furthering. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 
400, 408-09 (1988) (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974)); Rock v. 
Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 48, 53 (1987); Id. at 63 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Crane v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690-91 (1986); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973) 
("The right of cross-examination is more than a desirable rule of trial procedure. It is 
implicit in the constitutional right of confrontation, and helps assure the 'accuracy of the 
truth-determining process."' (quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970))). 
84. 388 U.S. 14 (1967). 
85. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. at 19. In Washington, the Court held that a state rule 
of evidence that excluded "whole categories" of testimony on the basis of a presumption of 
unreliability was unconstitutional. Id. at 22. 
86. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973). Chambers followed Washington v. 
Texas and Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95 (1972). Webb was the first case to rest a defendant's 
right to present evidence solely on the Due Process Clause, rather than referring to the 
specifically enumerated rights of the Fifth or Sixth Amendments. See Robert N. Clinton, The 
Right to Present a Defense: An Emergent Constitutional Guarantee in Criminal Trials, 9 IND. 
L. REv. 713, 778 (1976). In Webb, the defendant's only witness was a prisoner with an 
extensive criminal record. Webb, 409 U.S. at 95. The witness refused to testify altogether 
after the trial judge emphatically warned him not to perjure himself. Id. at 95-96. The 
Supreme Court determined that the judge's statement coerced the witness into refusing to 
testify and thus denied the defendant the right to present evidence in his defense. Id. at 98. 
Much like the exclusion of accomplice testimony in Washington, Webb involved the absolute 
exclusion of a defense witness' testimony, and therefore could have been decided on Sixth 
Amendment grounds. See Clinton, supra, at 781. Chambers is significant because it dealt 
with only a partial exclusion of witness testimony, and because the Court disposed of the 
case by referring only to the Due Process Clause. See id. at 791. Chambers, therefore, clearly 
stands for a defendant's fundamental right to present defense evidence. See id. at 791-92. But 
see Peter Westen, Compulsory Process II, 74 MICH. L. REV. 191, 207 (1975) (concluding that 
Washington v. Texas stands for a defendant's "constitutional right to present any evidence 
that may be deemed to establish the existence of facts in his favor" (emphasis omitted)). 
Since Chambers, the Court has consistently found a fundamental right to present a defense 
that includes a right to present defense evidence. In Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979), 
the Court considered a case where the trial court excluded critical defense evidence on 
hearsay grounds. Once again, the Court reasoned that the exclusion violated the Due 
Process Clause because the evidence was highly relevant to a critical issue in the case. See id. 
at 97. In Crane v. Kentucky, the Court held that the exclusion of evidence, pertaining to 
whether a defendant's confession was voluntary, deprived the defendant of a fair 
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stated that "the very integrity of the judicial system and public 
confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts, 
within the framework of the rules of evidence."s7 
Once a defendant has gone to trial and been allowed to present her 
defense,  it may seem that the constitutional right to present a defense 
has been satisfied and the government has no further obligation. In 
the context of the acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment, however, 
there is a further obligation not to use the exercise of that right against 
the defendant in a way that amounts to an unconstitutional pressure.ss 
As the Eleventh Circuit explained in United States v. Rodriguez, the 
sentencing court is well within its rights to examine "the defendant's 
conduct prior to, during, and after the trial to determine if the 
defendant has shown any remorse through his actions or statements."s9 
The chances of a court granting an adjustment may well be reduced if 
the defendant has exercised all of his rights during the entire process.90 
If a defendant has shown some sign of remorse but has also exercised 
constitutional or statutory rights, however, "the sentencing judge may 
not balance the exercise of those rights against the defendant's 
expression of remorse to determine whether the 'acceptance' is 
adequate. "91 
Courts can not create an outright penalty for the exercise of a 
constitutional right, such as a criminal fine or increased punishment.92 
Courts also may not condition the receipt of a government benefit on 
opportunity to present a defense. 476 U.S. 683 (1986). In Rock v. Arkansas, the Court 
determined that the automatic exclusion of post-hypnotically refreshed testimony violated 
the defendant's right to present a defense. 483 U.S. 44, 52 (1987). 
87. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 409 (1988) (rejecting state's argument that the 
constitutional right to present a defense can never be violated by the exclusion of evidence 
as a sanction for the violation of a discovery rule). 
88. See United States v. Vance, 62 F.3d 1 152, 1159 (9th Cir. 1995) (explaining that it is a 
well established proposition that taking advantage of a constitutional right cannot be 
weighed against a defendant in determining eligibility for the acceptance-of-responsibility 
adjustment); United States v. Sitton, 968 F.2d 947, 962 (9th Cir. 1992). But see United States 
v. Wright, 133 F.3d 1412 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that court may deny a 3El.l reduction for 
conduct inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility, even if the court relies exclusively on 
conduct that includes assertion of a constitutional right). 
89. United States v. Rodriguez, 959 F.2d 193, 197 (11th Cir. 1992) (finding that the 
sentencing court improperly balanced evidence of contrition against defendants' exercise of 
their Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination and their Sixth 
Amendment right to appeal). 
90. Id. 
91. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
92 See McCabe v. Sharrett, 12 F.3d 1558, 1562 (11th Cir. 1994) ("Obviously the 
government burdens a constitutional right when it imposes a direct penalty such as a 
criminal fine on its exercise."); United States v. Perez-Franco, 873 F.2d 455, 463 (1st Cir. 
1989) (finding that incarceration for a longer period of time is "one of a wide variety of 
penalties which can serve to trigger a constitutional violation"). 
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the relinquishment of a constitutional right.93 Imposing such a 
condition is viewed as burdening the right because it deters exercising 
the right to the same extent as a direct penalty. The amount of 
pressure - short of an outright penalty - that can be exerted on a 
constitutional right before the pressure becomes unconstitutional is 
less certain.94 
The current presumption against courts granting an acceptance-of­
responsibility adjustment when a defendant proceeds to trial,95 for 
example, does not exert an unconstitutional amount of pressure. Many 
defendants have attacked the presumption on constitutional grounds 
because the sentencing court may not hold the constitutionally 
protected conduct of defendants against them when determining a 
sentence.96 Specifically, defendants argue that they are being penalized 
by not receiving the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction merely 
because they exercised their constitutional right to trial,97 their right 
93. See Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996) (finding, in the 
First Amendment context, "that 'constitutional violations may arise from the deterrent, or 
chilling, effect of governmental [efforts] that fall short of a direct prohibition"' (alterations in 
original)); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) ("Even though the government 
may deny [a] . . .  benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the 
government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his 
constitutionally protected interests . . . .  "). 
94. The Supreme Court has not consistently applied the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LA w: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 796 
(1997). In FCC v. League of Women Voters, 486 U.S. 364 (1984), for example, the Supreme 
Court held unconstitutional a federal statute that prohibited any noncommercial 
educational-broadcasting station that received a grant from the Corporation for Public 
Broadcasting from engaging in editorializing. The Court explained that the government 
could not condition funds on a requirement that the stations relinquish their right to 
editorialize. Id. In Regan v. Taxation with Representation., 461 U.S. 540 (1983), however, the 
Court upheld a provision of the federal tax law that conditioned tax-exempt status on a 
requirement that an organization not participate in lobbying or partisan political activities. 
The Court explained that Congress had not infringed any First Amendment right - it had 
simply chosen not to pay for TWR's lobbying. Id. at 546. The Court also refrained from 
applying the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
Rust was a challenge to a federal regulation that barred recipients of federal funds for 
family-planning services from providing abortion counseling. Id. at 179. The Court explained 
that the "legislature's decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not 
infringe the right." Id. at 193 (citations omitted). 
95. USSG § 3El.1. 
96. See, e.g. , United States v. Rodriguez, 959 F.2d 193, 197 (11th Cir. 1992); United 
States v. Watt, 910 F.2d 587, 592 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Gonzalez, 897 F.2d 1018 
(9th Cir. 1990). The Federal Sentencing Guidelines also explain that in determining the 
sentence to impose, "the court may consider, without limitation, any information concerning 
the background, character and conduct of the defendant, unless otherwise prohibited by 
law." USSG § lBl.4. 
97. The right to trial is implicated because defendants who enter into plea agreements 
are more likely to receive the adjustment than those who go to trial and maintain their 
innocence. For example, between October 1, 2000 and September 30, 2001, 96.9% of drug 
offenders entered into plea agreements and 3.1 % went to trial. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 73 (6th ed. 2001). During that same 
period, 91.3% of drug offenders received an acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment while 
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against compelled self-incrimination,98 or their right to appeal.99 Most 
courts, however, resolve the issue of constitutionality by stating that 
the possibility of leniency in the statute does not make denial of the 
lenient treatment impermissible punishment, provided that the 
sentencing judge has actually determined that the defendant has not 
accepted responsibility.100 The force of this reasoning lessens, though, 
when an appellate court creates a per se rule prohibiting district judges 
from making the acceptance-of-responsibility determination. 
It is the district court that decides whether to grant an acceptance­
of-responsibility adjustment.101 The district court is in a unique 
position to evaluate a defendant's acceptance of responsibility and, as 
a result, the determination of the sentencing judge is termed a 
question of fact and subject to the clearly erroneous standard on 
review.102 The refusal of some district courts to apply the factors set 
forth in the Application Notes to defendants who claimed an 
entrapment defense at trial is the first step in the erosion of 
defendants' constitutional right to present a defense. When appellate 
courts affirm the district courts' misapplication of the sentencing 
guidelines, they transform a one-time violation into a per se rule 
prohibiting district courts from granting the adjustment. Once that 
happens, the failure to protect defendants' constitutional right to 
present the entrapment defense is complete. 
8.7% of drug offenders received no adjustment. Id. at 43. The total percentage of all 
defendants who received the adjustment was 91.2 %. Id. at 42. 
98. The Fifth Amendment states that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case 
to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V. This amendment has long been 
interpreted to mean that a defendant may refuse to "answer official questions put to him in 
any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might 
incriminate him in future criminal proceedings." Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973). 
The right against compelled self-incrimination is at stake because in order to show remorse 
one must often admit her crime at the sentencing stage. See United States v. Larkin, 171 F.3d 
556, 559 n.4 (7th Cir. 1999) (explaining that although section 3El.1 rewards a defendant who 
demonstrates contrition through an honest and full account of his offense conduct, it does 
not impose any new penalty on a defendant who chooses to keep silent, and thus does not 
offend the Fifth Amendment). The privilege against self-incrimination applies at sentencing 
just as it does during any other stage of the prosecution. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462-
63 (1981). 
99. The right to appeal is in jeopardy because defendants maintain their innocence in 
order to preserve their right to appeal. 
100. See, e.g. , United States v. Watt, 910 F.2d 587, 590 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. 
Monsour, 893 F.2d 126, 129 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that section 3El.1 does not penalize a 
defendant for exercising his right to trial); United States v. Paz Uribe, 891 F.2d 396, 400 (1st 
Cir. 1989) (rejecting a Fifth Amendment challenge to section 3El.1); United States v. Henry, 
883 F.2d 1010, 1011 (11th Cir. 1989) ("We are unprepared to equate the possibility of 
leniency with impermissible punishment."). 
101. See United States v. Chevre, 146 F.3d 622, 625 (8th Cir. 1998). 
102 See, e.g. , United States v. Mitchell, 113 F.3d 1528, 1533 (10th Cir. 1997). 
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This problem is exemplified in cases such as United States v. 
Chevre,103 United States v. Demes,104 and United States v. Kirkland.105 In 
each of these cases a defendant claimed entrapment at trial, the 
district court refused to grant an acceptance-of-responsibility 
adjustment, and the defendant appealed.106 Blinded by the defense of 
entrapment, the courts gave little or no consideration to the factors set 
forth in the Application Notes.107 Specifically, the Eighth Circuit stated 
that "Chevre's election to argue an entrapment defense . . .  clearly 
shows that he did not accept responsibility for the crime of 
103. Chevre, 146 F.3d at 623. Russell Chevre was arrested as part of an undercover 
operation. Id. Before trial, Chevre met with an agent with the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal 
Apprehension (BCA). Id. During that meeting, Chevre admitted to the agent that he was 
carrying approximately eight ounces of methamphetamine and $5,800 in cash at the time of 
his arrest. Id. Additionally, Chevre told the agent the name of his supplier and that he had 
purchased methamphetamine from that supplier on eight to ten occasions before his arrest. 
Id. Chevre claimed entrapment at trial and was convicted. Id. 
104. 941 F.2d 220 (3d Cir. 1991). Joseph E. Demes was arrested by an undercover 
detective. He was charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and 
distribution of cocaine. Id. at 221. Demes had reached a plea agreement with the 
government in which he agreed to plead guilty and cooperate with the government in its 
investigation in exchange for the government's recommendation of an acceptance-of­
responsibility adjustment. Id. Although Demes assisted the authorities, he chose not to take 
the plea agreement. Id. 
105. 104 F.3d 1403 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Keith Kirkland was arrested following his sale of 
crack cocaine to DEA Agent Ronald Woods. Id. at 1403. An informant who knew Kirkland 
arranged the sale, and Kirkland admitted selling the drugs. Id. Kirkland disputed the state's 
evidence of predisposition to commit the crime by testifying that he had no prior experience 
as a drug dealer, was unfamiliar with how drugs are sold, and that he followed the 
informant's instructions in completing the sale. Id. at 1403-04. The jury convicted Kirkland. 
The presentence report did not recommend an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility 
because Kirkland stated that he was entrapped. Id. at 1404. 
106. Chevre, 146 F.3d at 625; Kirkland, 104 F.3d at 1404; Demes, 941 F.2d at 222. At 
sentencing in the Kirkland case, the following exchange took place: 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: . . .  I think even though Mr. Kirkland went to trial in this 
matter - and in fact he testified - I think that he accepted responsibility, and I don't 
think that his testimony was any different to that effect. He admitted to giving the 
undercover officer the drugs. 
THE COURT: He said he was entrapped . . .  I don't regard that as . . .  acceptance of 
responsibility. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, I don't think that because a person legitimately 
claims a legitimate defense, that in claiming that, that he somehow is not accepting 
responsibility for what he did. My understanding of what he said was he explained why 
he did it. He didn't say he didn't do it. He said, I did it. That's accepting responsibility. 
That's a knowing act of what he did. He only explained to the court why he did it. I 
don't think that going forward with a legitimate defense is an indication indicating that 
he does not accept responsibility. 
THE COURT: That is the most absurd argument I have ever heard. 
Kirkland, 104 F.3d at 1404. 
107. See Chevre, 146 F.3d at 625 (rejecting the defendants request to ignore his assertion 
of entrapment and look instead to his admission to the BCA agent that he engaged in the 
conduct underlying his conviction). 
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conviction."108 In Demes, the Third Circuit described a claim of 
entrapment at trial as "the antithesis of the acceptance of 
responsibility."109 In Kirkland, the D.C. Circuit stated that it could not 
hypothesize a situation in which a defendant who claimed entrapment 
could demonstrate acceptance of responsibility and be entitled to a 
downward adjustment. no 
A defendant who raises entrapment, like any other defendant, 
must accept the foreseeable and constitutionally permissible legal 
consequences that flow from strategic decisions. One acceptable 
consequence is that the entrapment defense will be rejected by the 
jury and the sentencing judge will view that as a credibility 
determination. Likewise, asserting the entrapment defense may mean 
that the judge will not believe the defendant when she attempts to 
show that she is remorseful, and the defendant will be denied the 
Section 3El.1  adjustment.111 The threat of ignoring the leniency 
factors in the Application Notes creates a very real pressure against a 
defendant's constitutional right to present the entrapment defense. 
The defendant, believing that an unsuccessful entrapment defense 
might prejudice her sentence, may decide to accept a plea bargain 
rather than assert her constitutional right to present the entrapment 
defense. 
A prosecutor, when engaged in the negotiation phase of plea 
bargaining,112 may confront the defendant with the risk of more severe 
108. Id. In reality, however, Chevre admitted not only the conduct comprising the 
offense of conviction, but at least eight other offenses as well. In addition, he voluntarily 
assisted law enforcement officials by revealing the name of his supplier, and he was not 
offered a deal in exchange for that information. Id. Assistance to law enforcement officials is 
a factor that is supposed to be taken into account when a defendant who goes to trial 
requests the adjustment. See USSG § 3El.1 ,  cmt. n.l(e). Admission of criminal conduct is 
also supposed to be taken into consideration. See USSG § 3El.1, cmt. n.l(a). In Chevre's 
case, it is beyond dispute that Chevre both assisted law enforcement and admitted his 
criminal conduct. 
109. Demes, 941 F.2d at 222. The court upheld the district court's determination that the 
downward adjustment was unwarranted, explaining that it is "difficult to reconcile Deme's 
claim of entrapment with his contention that he accepted responsibility." Id. The court left 
the door open by saying that "it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of 
entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility;" it immediately 
closed that door, however, by pointing out that the claim of entrapment was "made by a 
person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine." 
Id. There was no discussion of whether the defendant assisted law enforcement, admitted his 
criminal conduct, or even whether the defendant appeared to be remorseful. 
110. See Kirkland, 104 F.3d at 1405. Ultimately, the court rested its decision on the fact 
that a defendant who claims entrapment contests his intent to commit the crime that is a 
factual element of guilt. Id.; see also supra Part I. There was absolutely no discussion of 
whether Kirkland's pretrial behavior merited an acceptance-of-responsibility departure. 
111.  While this may be a natural consequence, section 3El.1 clearly instructs courts to 
examine pretrial statements and conduct to determine if a defendant who proceeded to trial 
is deserving of the acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment. USSG § 3El.l. 
112. The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of counsel at plea negotiations, 
see Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970), the need for a public record indicating 
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punishment even though that risk has a "discouraging effect on the 
defendant's assertion of his trial rights."113 Imposing these "difficult 
choices" on a defendant is a permissible part of a system which allows 
the negotiation of pleas.114 There is, however, a line that divides the 
constitutional from the unconstitutional consequences. That line is 
defined by the distinction between plea bargaining, which presents a 
defendant with a benefit/detriment choice prior to trial, and 
presenting a defense at trial, which presents a defendant with the 
wholly negative antecedent of being foreclosed from an acceptance-of­
responsibility adjustment. Put another way, "difficult choices" become 
unconstitutional when the "choice" is restricted to selecting among 
harms. In the plea-bargain context, the defendant is required to 
choose between forgoing trial with the certainty that he will receive a 
lesser sentence either because the charges will be less severe or 
because he will receive an acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment, 
and going to trial with the possibility of more severe charges but also 
with the possibility of being acquitted of all charges. In this context, 
however, the defendant has already chosen to go to trial and the per se 
rule places a restriction on what the defendant can present once there. 
The defendant must either forgo the right to present the entrapment 
defense or forgo the right to be considered for the acceptance-of­
responsibility adjustment. When the risk of more severe punishment 
in the plea-bargain "choice," becomes the certainty of more severe 
punishment under the per se bar, the line has been crossed. 
The Supreme Court has cautioned that "not every burden on the 
exercise of a constitutional right, and not every encouragement to 
waive such a right, is invalid."115 For example, Section 3El.1 provides 
an incentive to plead guilty116 that does not violate the defendant's 
Sixth Amendment right to trial117 because it does not constitute a "per 
se policy of punishing those who elect to stand trial" and "the leniency 
decision is an individualized one, not based merely on the defendant's 
decision to go to trial."118 A per se rule against eligibility for the 
that a plea was voluntarily and knowingly made, see Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 
(1969), and the requirement that a prosecutor's plea bargaining promise must be kept, see 
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971). 
1 13. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1977). 
114. Id. 
115. Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 218 (1978). 
1 16. See USSG § 3El.1, cmt. n.3 (explaining that the entry of guilty plea along with the 
admission of the conduct comprising the offense and any additional relevant conduct will 
constitute "significant evidence" of acceptance of responsibility). 
117. United States v. Saunders, 973 F.2d 1354, 1362 (7th Cir. 1992) ("It is well 
established under the so-called unconstitutional conditions doctrine that a defendant may 
not be subjected to more severe punishment for exercising his or her constitutional right to 
stand trial." (citing Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 434 (1980))). 
1 18. Id. at 1362-63 (collecting cases). 
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adjustment for defendants who proceed to trial would mean that the 
leniency decision is no longer an individualized decision. While 
denying a reduction in sentence for leniency in an individual case is 
not a penalty implicating the exercise of the constitutional right to 
trial, a per se rule against eligibility for leniency is. The exercise of the 
constitutional right to present a defense, just like the exercise of any 
other constitutional right, may diminish the defendant's chances of 
being granted the acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment because it is 
likely that there is less evidence of acceptance of responsibility to 
weigh in the defendant's favor.119 As the right to present a defense 
stands on equal constitutional footing with other rights protected by 
the Sixth Amendment,120 however, a court cannot ignore the evidence 
of contrition simply because the defendant exercised his constitutional 
right to present the entrapment defense.121 
Courts do have a legitimate interest which can be asserted into the 
constitutional calculus. Historically, the Supreme Court's treatment of 
the constitutional right to present a defense has dealt with evidentiary 
or procedural rules or rulings affecting the presentation of defense 
evidence.122 In general, evidentiary rules are concerned with reliability 
and procedural rules tend to focus on judicial economy, regularization, 
and procedural reciprocity.123 The Court typically examines the 
fairness of a rule or ruling to the accused.124 Therefore, there are 
instances in which the constitutional right to present a defense may be 
outweighed by other interests.125 
Nonetheless, in Rock v. Arkansas the Supreme Court concluded 
that restrictions on the right to present criminal-defense evidence can 
be constitutional only if they "accommodate other legitimate interests 
in the criminal trial process" and are not "arbitrary or dispropor­
tionate to the purposes they are designed to serve."126 One of the 
119. See United States v. LaPierre, 998 F.2d 1460, 1468 (9th Cir. 1993). 
120. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 409 (1988) (citing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 
14, 18 (1967)). 
121. See LaPierre, 998 F.2d at 1468 (explaining, in a case involving the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, that the court may not "discount evidence 
of contrition because of a refusal to discuss the facts of the case with the probation officer"). 
122 See Clinton, supra note 86, at 796 (extrapolating a constitutional test from the many 
cases dealing with the constitutional right to present a defense). 
123. See id. at 796-97. 
124. Id. 
125. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988), in which the Supreme Court upheld the 
exclusion of a defense witness's testimony as a sanction for defense counsel's discovery-rule 
violation. The Court stated that rules providing for pretrial discovery serve the interests 
protected by the Compulsory Process Clause in providing a "full and truthful disclosure of 
critical facts." Id. at 412. 
126. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52 (1987). 
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central purposes involved is in satisfying the defendant's and society­
at-large's interest in "accurate adjudication."127 Putting forth all 
evidence bearing on the circumstances surrounding the commission of 
the crime furthers that interest. The procedural interest of the courts 
must be balanced with the societal interest in accurate adjudication. In 
Crane v. Kentucky,128 for example, the Supreme Court held that, 
"exclusion of . . . exculpatory evidence deprives a defendant of the 
basic right to have the prosecutor's case encounter and 'survive the 
crucible of meaningful adversarial testing."'129 Crane, therefore, serves 
as a cautionary note to circuits that fail to adequately justify 
application of a per se rule. 
The circuits that have created per se rules have justified their 
actions by focusing on the theoretical inconsistency between 
entrapment and acceptance of responsibility.13° As previously 
explained, however, the receipt of an acceptance-of-responsibility 
adjustment can be consistent with the entrapment defense. Evidence 
of entrapment, much like evidence of the circumstances surrounding a 
confession, would be essential to a defendant's argument for acquittal. 
It is true that in the context of the acceptance-of-responsibility 
adjustment evidence is not actually being excluded. Interpreting the 
Section 3El.1 adjustment to exclude defendants who present evidence 
of entrapment, though, could assert enough pressure to completely 
discourage use of the entrapment defense. 
The uncertainty that comes along with the choice to raise 
entrapment and possibly not receive the Section 3El. 1  adjustment or 
to plead guilty and be virtually guaranteed the adjustment is 
constitutionally permissible discouragement. What is impermissible is 
for the courts to leverage the per se bar against all defendants who 
would claim entrapment. The pressures asserted by a per se rule are 
far-reaching. A defendant's lawyer will advise her that raising the 
defense would preclude the adjustment if she is found guilty; this 
knowledge then puts the defendant in a position to roll the 
127. Torn Stacy, The Search for the Truth in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 91 
COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1391 (1991) (arguing that the Court's treatment of the constitutional 
right to present a defense, a truth furthering right, does not evidence a true commitment to 
accurate adjudication). 
128. 476 U.S. 683 (1986). In Crane, the Court found that the constitutional right to 
present a defense was violated when the defendant was prevented from introducing evidence 
of the circumstances surrounding his confession. Crane, 476 U.S. at 690-91. The Court 
explained that "an essential component of procedural fairness is an opportunity to be heard" 
and that right "would be an empty one" if the states, without valid justification, "were 
permitted to exclude competent, reliable evidence bearing on the credibility of a confession 
when such evidence is central to the defendant's claim of innocence." Id. at 690. 
129. Crane, 476 U.S. at 690-91 (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 
(1984)). 
130. See supra notes 107-1 10 and accompanying text. 
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constitutional dice. That pressure infringes on defendants' 
constitutional right to present a defense because it assumes that all 
defendants who claim entrapment are not credible and are 
undeserving of the Section 3El.1 adjustment regardless of their pre­
trial conduct and other individual circumstances. Taking away the 
possibility of leniency from an entire class of defendants simply 
because they claimed entrapment at trial is offensive to the 
defendants' constitutional right to present a defense. If it is the 
possibility of leniency that saved Section 3El.1 from constitutional 
attack,131 then removing that possibility places Section 3El.1 on 
precarious constitutional ground.132 
Justice Stevens, dissenting in Corbitt v. New Jersey, stated that 
" [w)here the legislature, prosecutor, judge, or all three deliberately 
employ their charging and sentencing powers to induce a defendant to 
tender a plea of guilty and where they do so with the objective of 
penalizing a person's reliance on his legal rights such action is patently 
unconstitutional."133 Such is the case here. The Supreme Court has 
very clearly stated that " [t]o punish a person because he has done 
what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the 
most basic sort."134 In these circumstances, a defendant may enter into 
a plea bargain rather than proceed to trial with a legitimate 
131. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
132. In interpreting an earlier version of the Sentencing Guidelines, the circuit courts 
split over whether a defendant could be denied an acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment 
because he refused to make self-incriminating statements related to conduct included in 
counts to which he had not pied guilty. Compare United States v. Piper, 918 F.2d 839 (9th 
Cir. 1990) (finding that requiring a defendant to accept responsibility other than for the 
count to which he pied guilty in order to receive a reduction would violate the defendant's 
Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself); United States v. Oliveras, 905 F.2d 623 
(2d Cir. 1990) (same); United States v. Perex-Franco, 873 F.2d 455 (1st Cir. 1989) (same), 
with United States v. Ross, 920 F.2d 1530 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding that to deny a defendant a 
reduction because he will not acknowledge the full extent of his criminal behavior places no 
unconstitutional burden on the defendant's right against self incrimination); United States v. 
Gordon, 895 F.2d 932 (4th Cir. 1989) (same); United States v. Henry, 883 F.2d 1010 (11th 
Cir. 1989) (same). To resolve the controversy, the Sentencing Commission amended the 
Application Notes to read: 
Note that a defendant is not required to volunteer, or affirmatively admit, relevant conduct 
beyond the offense of conviction in order to obtain a reduction under subsection (a). A 
defendant may remain silent in respect to relevant conduct beyond the offense of conviction 
without affecting his ability to obtain a reduction under this subsection. 
USSG § 3El.1, cmt. n. l(a) (2002). Thus, the Sentencing Commission sided with the courts 
that found it unconstitutional to make a defendant admit conduct to which he did not plead 
guilty to remain eligible for the acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment. In so doing, the 
Sentencing Commission reaffirmed once again its aversion to rules that completely take 
away the possibility of leniency. 
133. Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 232 n.7 (1978) (Stevens, J. dissenting) (internal 
citations and quotations omitted). 
134. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 
395 U.S. 711 ,  738 (1969)). 
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entrapment defense because she knows that if the entrapment defense 
is unsuccessful she will be penalized, in the form of the court's refusal 
to consider an acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment, for the 
exercise of her right to present the entrapment defense. This result 
will be obtained regardless of the remorse shown by the defendant. 
Thus, to prevent this unconstitutional penalty, the Section 3E1 . 1  
adjustment must be interpreted to allow defendants who proceed to 
trial to claim entrapment to remain eligible for the adjustment. Such a 
construction protects the delicate constitutional balance created by 
Section 3E1.l.  
CONCLUSION 
This Note shows that the defense of entrapment is consistent with 
the Federal Sentencing Guideline's acceptance-of-responsibility 
adjustment. In drafting the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the 
Sentencing Commission attempted to lessen the sentencing disparity 
that resulted from pre-guideline sentencing. The Commission reserved 
some sentencing flexibility by creating adjustments to the guidelines, 
such as the acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment. The entrapment 
defense fits into the exception in Section 3El.1 Application Note 2, 
which allows defendants who proceed to trial to receive the 
adjustment, because entrapment is not a challenge to factual guilt, but 
rather a challenge as to whether the statute applies to the defendant's 
conduct. 
This interpretation of the statute safeguards the constitutional 
right of defendants to present an entrapment defense at trial. It also 
allows the punishment a defendant receives to be based on her 
individual circumstances, thus furthering the basic sentencing purpose 
of just deserts. When courts create per se rules preventing defendants 
who claim entrapment to receive the acceptance-of-responsibility 
adjustment, they not only violate defendants' constitutional right to 
present a defense, but also take away a sentencing court's ability to 
create a fair and just sentence. The Sentencing Commission set forth 
factors to determine whether a defendant has accepted responsibility 
for his crime. Therefore, these factors should guide the sentencing 
court's determination, and not a defendant's entrapment defense. As 
the entrapment defense can be consistent with the acceptance-of­
responsibility adjustment, the denial of an acceptance-of-responsibility 
adjustment solely on the basis of an entrapment defense is a violation 
of the constitutional right to present a defense. 
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